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The “Reasonable Plant” Test: When Progress 
Outruns the Constitution
Max Stul Oppenheimer*
INTRODUCTION
As  the  world  searches  for  new  sources  of  energy, 
attention  has  focused  on  renewable  sources,  such  as 
plants.  One approach to motivating investments in new 
technology is to provide limited term monopolies through 
the patent statute.  With the passage of the Townsend-
Purnell Plant Patent Act (PPA)1 in 1930, the United States 
became the first country in the world to provide a form of 
patent protection for plants.2  At the time, Francis Crick 
was a student3 and James Watson had just celebrated his 
second birthday4—their discovery of the helical structure 
of  DNA was more than twenty-two years in the future.5 
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1
1
. Townsend-Purnell  Plant Patent Act,  ch. 312,  § 1, 46 Stat.  376 
(1930)  (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.  § 161 (2000))  [hereinafter 
PPA].
2
2
. “Plants were first explicitly brought within the scope of patent 
protection in 1930 when the PPA included ‘plants’  among the useful 
things subject to patents.” J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 
U.S. 124, 132 (2001).  Even today, international patent harmonization 
agreements  allow  countries  to  deny  patent  protection  to  plants. 
“Members  may . . .  exclude from patentability . . .  plants and animals 
other than micro-organisms . . . .”  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World  Trade  Organization,  Annex  1C   art.  27(3)(b),  Apr.  15,  1994, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ legal_e/27-trips.pdf.
3
3
. NobelPrize.org, Francis Crick: The Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine  1962, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/  crick-
bio.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
4
4
. NobelPrize.org, James Watson: The Nobel Prize in Physiology or 
Medicine  1962, 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/  watson-
bio.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
5
5
. Steve Sternberg,  Double Helix Unlocked Key to Life,  USA TODAY, 
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Convinced  that  advances  in  agriculture  deserved  patent 
protection, Congress attempted to accommodate the core 
concepts  of  patent  law  to  the  technology  of  plant 
propagation that existed at the time, in essence defining a 
plant  by  its  physical  rather  than  genetic  characteristics.6 
This required bending traditional patent rules, but although 
Congress  gave  plant  patent  applicants  the  necessary 
latitude, it also required them to use reasonable efforts to 
meet the standard rules.7
Developments in biotechnology since 1930 have been 
dramatic.  Scientific advances have not only undercut the 
need for the special rules created by the PPA but have also 
created  a  trap,  which  may  deprive  modern  inventors  of 
protection for the development of novel plants.  Moreover, 
while new applicants can avoid it, the owners of thousands 
of issued plant patents have fallen into the trap and cannot 
remedy the error unless Congress provides relief.8
This  article  describes  the  enduring  core  principles  of 
utility  patent  law and identifies  those that  posed special 
problems for the agriculture industry in 1930 and led to the 
adoption  of  a  sui  generis plant  patent  law.   It  then 
demonstrates  that,  although  the  statute  which  controls 
plant  patents  has  not  changed  significantly  since  its 
adoption in 1930, changes in biotechnology have in effect 
rewritten the requirements for patentability in a way which 
renders  most  recently  granted  plant  patents  invalid. 
Finally, it demonstrates how future applicants can avoid the 
trap which has been created by advancing technology, and 
proposes changes in  the statute  which  could  save those 
patents  already  issued and,  in  the  process,  improve the 
examination  of  plant  patent  applications  and  provide 
stronger protection for the agriculture industry.
I. CORE PRINCIPLES OF U.S. PATENT LAW
While U.S. patent law has been amended several times 
since  1930,9 certain  core  principles  have  remained  the 
Feb. 24, 2003, at D01.
6
6
. Rev. Stat. § 4886, as amended by Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, § 
1, 46 Stat.  376 (current version split between 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 161 
(2000)).
7
7
. Id.
8
8
. See infra Part V, notes 120–122 and accompanying text.
9
9
. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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same  and  could  not  be  changed  without  fundamentally 
altering the system.  The power to create a patent system 
arises under Article I Section 8 of the Constitution, which 
authorized  Congress  to  reward  innovation  by  granting 
monopolies on inventions for a limited time.10  The power is 
exercised in Title 35 of the U. S. Code.11
Three types of patents are authorized: utility patents, 
design  patents,  and  plant  patents.12  The  utility  patent 
provisions authorize granting patents for inventions within 
one of four classes enumerated in the statute;13 the design 
patent  provisions  authorize  granting  patents  for 
ornamental  designs;14 and  the  plant  patent  provisions 
authorize granting patents for distinct and new varieties of 
plants that have been asexually reproduced.15
All three types of patents share (and have shared since 
their inception) certain core patent principles.  All require 
disclosure,  and  eventually  publication,  of  the  claimed 
10
1
. “The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the Progress of 
Science and useful  Arts,  by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors  the  exclusive  Right  to  their  respective  Writings  and 
Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.  For a detailed analysis of how 
the clause entered the Constitution,  see Walterscheid,  To Promote the 
Progress of Science and Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the 
Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J.  INTELL. 
PROP. L. 1, 31–34 (1994).
11 . 35 U.S.C. (2000).
12 . “Patents  issued under  § 161 are referred to  as ‘plant  patents,’ 
which  are  distinguished  from  § 101  utility  patents  and  §  171  design 
patents.” J.E.M. AG Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 133 n.5 
(2001).
13 . “Whoever  invents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful  process, 
machine,  manufacture,  or  composition  of  matter, . . .  may  obtain  a 
patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).  Certain types of inventions that fall 
within  one  of  these  so-called  statutory  categories  are  not  patentable 
under  judicially  created  exceptions.   Under  current  Supreme  Court 
caselaw  “Phenomena  of  nature,  though  just  discovered,  mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they 
are the basic tools of scientific  and technological  work.” Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).  Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
abstract ideas are also unpatentable.  Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 
185 (1981).  “[Phenomena of nature] . . . are part of the storehouse of 
knowledge . . . .   They are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all 
men  and  reserved  exclusively  to  none.”  Funk  Bros.  Seed  v.  Kalo 
Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
14 . 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
15 . 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).  Tuber propagated plants were excluded 
by the statute for political reasons. See infra note 66 and accompanying 
text.
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invention.16  The  fundamental  bargain  is  the  inventor’s 
surrender of  the details of an innovation in exchange for 
the  patent,  thereby  putting  the  public  in  possession  of 
information which the inventor could have kept confidential 
and  giving  the  inventor  an  assured  term  of  exclusive 
control over the invention.17 The bargain assures that the 
technology will not be lost.18 The vehicle for providing the 
required disclosure is the filing of a written application with 
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).19 The application 
process is designed to assure that the public has gotten fair 
value  in  the  bargain;  it  requires  determinations  that  the 
applicant is providing something the public did not already 
have20 and  the  applicant  has  provided  an  enabling 
description  of  the  invention  so  that,  once  the  patent 
expires,  the  public  will  be  able  to  make  and  use  the 
invention.21 In addition, the application must include claims 
which put competitors on notice as to what they can and 
cannot do.22 Thus, these core principles establish a system 
with the following characteristics:
1. The applicant for a patent must provide the patent 
office with enough information to determine whether what 
is claimed is in fact new and not obvious—this assures that 
the public does not pay the price of granting a monopoly 
for something in which it  already has or,  in the ordinary 
16
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2000).
17 . The  patent  owner’s  control  is  exclusive,  meaning  the  right  to 
exclude, but not exhaustive—the patent owner can only prevent others 
from making, using, selling or importing the patented invention. 35 U.S.C. 
§ 154(a) (2000).
18 . Ex parte Moore,  115 U.S.P.Q.  145,  147 (Bd.  Pat.  App.  & Interf. 
1957) (awarding inventorship to one who reproduced a peach tree over 
the first to notice the tree, since the objective of advancing the progress 
of science and useful arts was furthered by the applicant, whose actions 
had preserved for  posterity  a variety  that  otherwise would have been 
lost).
19 . Regulations governing review of patent applications are contained 
in Volume 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations,  see  37 C.F.R. (2007), 
and  specific  internal  rules  governing  the  examination  of  patent 
applications are contained in the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure 
(MPEP),  U.S.  PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
(8th ed. 2001, rev. Sept. 2007) [hereinafter MPEP].
20
2
. The claimed invention must be novel, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000), and 
non-obvious, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
21 . The  application  must  be  sufficiently  detailed  to  allow  one  of 
ordinary skill  in  the relevant  field  to  make and use the  invention.  35 
U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
22 . Id.
MAX STUL OPPENHEIMER, "THE 'REASONABLE PLANT' TEST: WHEN PROGRESS OUTRUNS THE CONSTITUTION," 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 417-452 (2008).
2008] THE REASONABLE PLANT TEST 421
course  of  events,  would  have  access  to.  Patents  have 
always been limited to novel inventions.23 As an incentive 
to add to public knowledge, a patent cannot be granted on 
something  which  would  restrict  something  already 
available  to  the  public24 or  which  would  be  obvious  to 
others of ordinary skill in the relevant field.25  As explained 
by  the  Supreme  Court  in  KSR  International  v.  Teleflex, 
“Granting patent protection to advances that would occur 
in  the  ordinary  course  without  real  innovation  retards 
progress  and  may,  in  the  case  of  patents  combining 
previously  known  elements,  deprive  prior  inventions  of 
their value or utility.”26
2. The  applicant  must  provide  sufficient  detail  that 
(once the patent expires) others will be able to make and 
use the invention.27
3. The applicant must specifically claim the invention, 
both so that the patent office can focus its evaluation of 
patentability and so that, if issued as a patent, others will 
23
2
. 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides: “Whoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, 
subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 
(2000).
35 U.S.C. § 102 provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless—
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or 
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign 
country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, 
or
(b)  the  invention  was  patented  or  described  in  a  printed 
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale 
in  this  country,  more  than  one  year  prior  to  the  date  of  the 
application for patent in the United States . . . .
24 . Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
25 . 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (“A patent may not be obtained though 
the  invention  is  not  identically  disclosed  or  described  as  set  forth  in 
section 102 of this title,  if  the differences between the subject matter 
sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter 
as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made 
to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains.”).
26 . 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1732 (2007).
27 . 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) (“The specification shall contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making 
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art  to which it pertains,  or with which it is  most 
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best 
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.”).
MAX STUL OPPENHEIMER, "THE 'REASONABLE PLANT' TEST: WHEN PROGRESS OUTRUNS THE CONSTITUTION," 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 417-452 (2008).
422 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
know what they are excluded from making, using, selling or 
importing.
Under utility  patent  law (as  it  exists  today and as  it 
existed in 1930), claims which the patent office determines 
comply with the statutory requirements may be issued as a 
patent.  The issued patent gives its owner the right to stop 
others  from  making,  using,  or  selling  products  (or 
processes) incorporating the claimed invention during the 
term of the patent.28
II. THE PROBLEM OF PLANTS CIRCA 1930
Prior  to  enactment  of  the  PPA,  it  was  commonly 
believed that the general utility patent rules posed special 
problems  when  applied  to  plants.   As  explained  by  the 
Supreme Court,
[p]rior to 1930, two factors were thought to remove plants from 
patent protection.  The first was the belief that plants, even those 
artificially  bred,  were  products  of  nature  for  purposes  of  the 
patent  law. . . .   The  second  obstacle  to  patent  protection  for 
plants was the fact that plants were thought not amenable to the 
“written description”[29] requirement of the patent law.30
As  the  Supreme  Court  has  since  made  clear,  those 
fears were unfounded: plants can be covered under both 
28
2
. The claims must define “the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  Post-1930 revisions to 
the statute added importation to the list of activities a patent owner may 
control. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
29 . 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent application describe the 
invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art” to make and use it. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
30
3
. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980).  See also 
David  G.  Scalise  &  Daniel  Nugent,  International  Intellectual  Property 
Protections for  Living Matter:  Biotechnology,  Multinational  Conventions 
and the Exception for Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 91 (1995) 
(“When a new plant differed from the old only in color, scent or texture, it 
was  almost  impossible  to  satisfy  the  written  description  requirement. 
Consequently, plant breeders were denied substantive protection for their 
discoveries,  derailing  innovation  in  this  field.”);  Anne  E.  Crocker,  Will 
Plants Finally Grow Into Full Patent Protection on an International Level?:  
A  Look at  the History  of  U.S.  and International  Patent  Law Regarding 
Patent  Protection  for  Plants  and  the  Likely  Changes  After  the  U.S.  
Supreme Court’s Decision in J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 8 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC.  L.  251, 257 (2003) (“One important feature of the PPA is that it 
helped plant  breeders  overcome the barrier  of  the written description 
requirements for obtaining a utility patent.  Developments in traditional 
plant  breeding  were hard  to  record  on paper  with  sufficient  detail  to 
satisfy  the  written  requirements  of  §  112,  yet  generally  these 
developments could easily be seen with the naked eye.”).
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the  specific  provisions  created  by  the  PPA31 and,  if  they 
meet the requirements of  the general  utility  provisions,32 
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.33  The specific provisions of the Plant 
Patent Act do not preempt the general  provisions of  the 
utility  patent  statute,34 plant  materials  are  clearly 
compositions  of  matter  (or  manufactures)35 and,  in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,  the Supreme Court rejected the 
argument that living matter was implicitly  excluded from 
statutory subject matter.36
When, acting in the erroneous37 belief that plants were 
not  patentable,  Congress  concluded  that  agricultural 
advances should be afforded the same type of protection 
as technological inventions,38 it faced several challenges in 
fitting 1930s plant technology into the framework of  the 
patent statute.
A. COULD PLANTS BE STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER?
The  first  challenge  was  whether  plants  fit  the 
requirements  of  statutory  subject  matter.39 Although  the 
line  of  Supreme  Court  cases  defining  the  “natural 
phenomenon” exclusion from statutory subject matter had 
not  yet  been  decided,40 it  was  generally  believed  that 
31
3
. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
32 . “Whoever  invents  or  discovers  any  new  and  useful  process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent . . .”
33 . J.E.M. Ag  Supply v.  Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern.,  534 U.S. 124,  145 
(2001).
34 . Id.
35 . Id. at 147.  See also Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, 444 (Bd. 
Pat. App. & Interf. 1985).
36 . 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
37 . While the belief that plants were not patentable may have been 
erroneous, Congress was certainly correct that the practical problems of 
complying with the patent requirements in 1930 would have been almost 
impossible  for  plants.   “In  1930,  no  written  description  could  have 
enabled creation of a plant, even if the ancestry and techniques of cross-
pollination were known—it was not possible to produce the plant from a 
disclosure  contemplated  by  35  U.S.C.  §  112  for  other  types  of 
manufactured articles.  Thus, a reasonably complete description of the 
new plant variety is all that could be required.”  In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 
929, 935 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
38 . S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 1 (1930).
39 . See supra notes 12–14, 29–38 and accompanying text.
40
4
. See Funk Bros. Seed v. Kalo Inoculant, 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) 
(noting that phenomena of nature are part of the storehouse of nature 
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plants were unpatentable,41 even those “made by man.”42 
The  dissent  in  Laboratory  Corporation  of  America  v. 
Metabolite Labs43 explains the philosophy behind exclusion 
of natural phenomena from patentable subject matter:
The  relevant  principle  of  law  “[e]xclude[s]  from . . .  patent 
protection . . . laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas” . . . .
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that 
“laws of nature” are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or 
that  they  are not  useful.   To  the contrary,  research into  such 
matters  may  be  costly  and  time-consuming; . . .  and  that 
research may prove of great benefit to the human race.  Rather, 
the reason for the exclusion is that sometimes  too much patent 
protection  can  impede  rather  than  “promote  the  Progress  of 
Science and useful  Arts,”  the constitutional  objective of  patent 
and copyright protection. . . .
The  problem  arises  from  the  fact  that  patents  do  not  only 
encourage  research  by  providing  monetary  incentives  for 
invention. Sometimes their presence can discourage research by 
impeding the free exchange of information . . . .44
B. COULD A PLANT BE DESCRIBED AND ENABLED?
The second problem facing a potential applicant for a 
patent on a plant was how to meet the requirement that 
the invention be described and enabled—how to provide a 
written patent application which would satisfy the second 
core principal of putting the invention in the public domain 
once  the  patent  expired.45  While  an  applicant  could 
certainly point out characteristics which distinguished their 
new  plant  from  other  plants,  often  these  characteristics 
would be difficult to establish objectively, as indicated by 
early  plant  patents  issued  under  the  1930  statute.  (For 
and free for all  to use);  Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63,  67 (1972) 
(noting that phenomena of nature are not patentable because they are 
the basic tools for scientific and technological work).
41
4
. J.E.M.  Ag   Supply  v.  Pioneer  Hi-bred  Int’l,  534  U.S.  124,  133 
(2001),  although that  belief  was wrong;  Diamond v.  Chakrabarty,  447 
U.S. 303, 311–12 (1980).
42 . As explained by the Supreme Court “Prior to 1930, two factors 
were thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first was the 
belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for 
purposes  of  the  patent  law. . . .”  Chakrabarty,  447  U.S.  at  311–12. 
Chakrabarty held that the patent statute extended to “anything under the 
sun made by man”, including living organisms.  Id. at 309.
43 . 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
44 . Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
45 . See INTRODUCTION, supra.
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example,  “good  flavor,”46 “superior  reproductive  and 
keeping  qualities,”47 “extreme  hardiness,”48 “superior 
producing  qualities,”49 or  “firmness  of  flesh,”50 or  whose 
color is “between red and carmine,”51 or which ripens late52 
were characterizations used.)  Even if that problem could 
have been  overcome with  standardized  terms,  a  second 
element  of  the  application  requirement  could  not  have 
been  met  in  1930:  enablement.   In  a  case  which  was 
decided after the Plant Patent Act was enacted, the Patent 
Office  Board  of  Interference  Examiners  noted  that   “the 
mere filing of an application for a patent for a new variety 
of  plant  would  not  enable  anyone  to  reproduce  such  a 
plant.”53  The same principle led to the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeal’s decision (again following enactment of 
the  Plant  Patent  Act)  that  a  photograph  of  a  rose  bush 
could not defeat a patent on the same rose bush since the 
photograph  could  not  enable  the  public  to  produce  the 
plant:54
[I]t  must be borne in mind that  there are inherent  differences 
between plants and manufactured articles.  Should a plant variety 
become extinct one cannot deliberately produce a duplicate even 
though  its  ancestry  and  the  techniques  of  cross-pollination  be 
known.   Manufactured  articles,  processes,  and  chemical 
compositions when disclosed are, however, susceptible to man-
made duplication. . . .
In  the  case  of  manufactured  articles,  processes  and  chemical 
compositions, a different situation prevails.  Written descriptions 
and  drawings  in  publications  can  often  enable  others  to 
manufacture  the  article,  practice  the  process  or  produce  the 
chemical composition.55
46
4
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 47 (issued Nov. 29, 1932) (pecan).
47 . U.S. Plant Patent No. 3 (issued Oct. 20, 1931) (carnation).
48 . U.S. Plant Patent No. 99 (issued June 26, 1931) (hybrid barberry).
49 . U.S. Plant Patent No. 11 (issued Mar. 22, 1932) (hybrid tea rose).
50
5
. U.S. Plant Patent No. 18 (issued July 19, 1932) (plum).
51 . U.S. Plant Patent No. 8 (issued Feb. 23, 1932) (rose).
52 . U.S. Plant Patent No.. 7  (issued Feb. 16, 1932) (peach).
53 . Dunn v. Ragin v. Carlile,  50 U.S.P.Q. 472, 474 (Bd. Pat.  App. & 
Interf. 1941).
54 . In  re LeGrice,  301  F.2d  929  (C.C.P.A.  1962).   The  decision, 
rendered in the same year  that  Watson and Crick  received the Nobel 
Prize for their discovery of the structure of DNA, explicitly left open the 
possibility  that  in  some  future  case  a  printed  publication  might  be 
enabling, a remarkable insight.
55 . Id. at 935.
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C. COULD A PLANT BE DISTINGUISHED FROM “PRIOR ART” PLANTS?
Yet another challenge to obtaining a patent for a plant 
was posed by the core requirement that patents are not 
granted to inventions already available to the public.56  In 
order to satisfy this requirement, there must be some way 
of determining what the public already has access to and 
how it differs from the claimed invention.  In the later case 
of Graham v. John Deere57 the Supreme Court explained the 
test for determining whether an invention was too close to 
already-available technology to be patentable:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be 
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at 
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness 
or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.58
Such a test requires that it be possible to identify the 
relevant characteristics in the prior art and in the claimed 
invention,  and  then  to  make  a  meaningful  comparison 
between them.  As is apparent from the types of patents 
granted shortly after enactment of the Plant Patent Act,59 
this would have posed a challenge in the context of plants. 
The types of characteristics being claimed as distinguishing 
the  applicants’  plants  would  have  required  subjective 
determinations  and  not  have  been  amenable  to 
differentiation from prior art plants.
D. COULD CLAIMS BE PRECISE ENOUGH TO IDENTIFY THE INVENTION?
Closely  related  to  the  problem  of  distinguishing  the 
claimed  plant  from  pre-existing  plants  (and  specifically, 
whether a prior publication enables the claimed plant) is 
the problem of how to define the claimed plant in such a 
way  that  the  public  can  tell  what  is  being  claimed.  A 
potential  competitor  is,  under  core  patent  principles, 
entitled to know what is available for use and what would 
constitute  infringement.60 Distinguishing  an  allegedly 
56
5
. This requirement is currently set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.  In 
1930,  the  requirement  would  have  been  found  in  Hotchkiss  v. 
Greenwood, 11 How. 248 (1851).
57 . 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
58 . Id. at 17.  The section referred to in the decision was not enacted 
until 1952, however, in Deere the Court held that enactment of § 103 did 
not change the law with respect to obviousness.
59 . See supra text accompanying notes 46–52.
60
6
. See INTRODUCTION, supra.
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infringing  plant  from  a  patented  plant  would  present 
exactly  the  same difficulties  as  distinguishing  a  claimed 
new plant from pre-existing plants.
III. THE 1930 SOLUTION: SPECIAL RULES FOR PLANTS
Congress addressed these concerns in the 1930 PPA, 
which amended general utility patent law to provide:
Any person who has invented or discovered any new and useful 
art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new 
and  useful  improvements  thereof,  or  who  has  invented  or 
discovered  and  asexually  reproduced  any  distinct  and  new 
variety of plant, other than a tuber-propagated plant, not known 
or  used  by  others  in  this  country,  before  his  invention  or 
discovery thereof, . . . may . . . obtain a patent therefor;61
“No plant patent shall be declared invalid for noncompliance . . . 
if the description is as complete as is reasonably possible;”62
and to provide: “Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to 
the patentee . . . of the exclusive right to make, use, and 
vend the invention or discovery (including in the case of a 
plant patent the exclusive right to asexually reproduce the 
plant).”63  That enactment was intended to address each of 
the problems posed above.
A. THE STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER “SOLUTION”
Congress resolved the issue of whether plants could be 
statutory subject matter simply by declaring it so under the 
broad  authority  granted  by  the  Constitution  to  promote 
scientific progress.64 Congress limited protection to plants 
61
6
. Act  of  May  23,  1930,  ch.  312,  sec.  1,  §  4886,  46  Stat.  376 
(emphasis  added).   The  comparable  provision  of  the  current  patent 
statute is found in 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) (“Whoever invents or discovers 
and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including 
cultivated  sports,  mutants,  hybrids,  and  newly  found  seedlings,  other 
than a tuber propagated plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, 
may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title.  The provisions of this title  relating to patents for inventions 
shall  apply to patents for plants, except as otherwise provided.”).  The 
1954  revision,  which  created  the  above  language,  made  explicit  that 
plants found in an uncultivated state were not patentable. Act of Sept. 3, 
1954, ch. 1259, 68 Stat. 1190.
62 . Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 2, § 4888, 46 Stat. 376.
63 . Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 1, § 4884, 46 Stat. 376 (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000)) (emphasis added).
64 . The  Constitutional  grant,  “Congress  shall  have  Power  . . .  to 
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
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reproduced  asexually.  The  rationale  is  that  asexual 
propagation by divisions or cuttings produces clones, each 
of  which is  identical  to the parent plant and to all  other 
cuttings  or  clones  taken  from  the  parent,  while  the 
production of seeds by cross-pollination does not assure a 
true new plant variety having the characteristics desired.65 
Congress  also  carved  out  an  exception  for  tuber-
propagated  plants,  accepting  the  argument  that  patents 
should not be allowed to control the part of the plant which 
was ultimately sold for food.66  In addition, the core patent 
principle  which  precludes  patenting  naturally  occurring 
phenomena would translate, in the plant patent system, to 
a  prohibition  on  patenting  uncultivated  plants,  and 
Congress believed it had done so.67
In  1952,  the  patent  statute  was  comprehensively 
revised and plant patents placed into a separate chapter, 
15  of  Title  35.68  The  United  States  Supreme  Court 
explained,
This  was  merely  a  housekeeping  measure  that  did  nothing  to 
change the substantive rights or requirements for a plant patent. 
A “plant patent” continued to provide only the exclusive right to 
asexually  reproduce  a  protected  plant,  and  the  description 
Writings and Discoveries,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is arguably limited 
to statutes which “promote progress,” but it would be hard to argue that 
providing  incentives  for  agricultural  innovation  falls  outside  that 
mandate.
65
6
. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962); accord Yoder Bros. v. 
Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 
1094 (1977) (“After a breeder has successfully isolated a new variety, the 
only  way  he  can  preserve  his  creation  is  by  means  of  asexual 
reproduction . . . .  Since a cutting is genetically identical  to the parent 
plant, it will develop into a plant whose characteristics match the parent’s 
exactly, so long as the same environmental conditions obtain.”);  id. at 
1380 (“Asexual reproduction is literally the only way that a breeder can 
be  sure  he  has  reproduced  a  plant  identical  in  every  respect  to  the 
parent.”).  However, a contemporary text notes that “[i]n general, plants 
raised by asexual propagation reproduce the parent plant exactly,  but 
there are a few exceptions to the rule.”  MONTAGUE FREE, PLANT PROPAGATION IN 
PICTURES 53 (1957) (listing several examples of exceptions).
66 . It  is  hard to  see  a  logical  reason why that  particular  category 
should receive special treatment from a patent perspective.
67 . “[T]he  committee  has,  by  its  amendment  in  striking  out  the 
patenting of ‘newly found’ varieties of plants, eliminated from the scope 
of the bill these wild varieties discovered by the plant explorer or other 
person who has in no way engaged either in plant cultivation or care and 
who has in no other way facilitated nature in the creation of a new and 
desirable variety.” S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 7 (1930).
68 . Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804.
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requirement remained relaxed.  To obtain a plant patent under § 
161  a  breeder  must  meet  all  of  the  requirements  for  §  101, 
except for the description requirement.69
In  1970,  recognizing  that  true-to-type  reproduction  had 
become possible for sexually reproduced plants, Congress 
passed the Plant Variety Protection Act70 (PVPA) to provide 
“patent-like  protection  to  novel  varieties  of  sexually 
reproduced plants (that is, plants grown from seed), which 
parallels  the  protection  afforded  asexually  reproduced 
plant varieties (that is, varieties reproduced by propagation 
or grafting)” under the Plant Patent Act.71  The PVPA was 
not intended to preempt other forms of protection.72
B. THE DESCRIPTION/ENABLEMENT SOLUTION
Congress  solved  the  description  and  enablement 
problem  by  relaxing  the  general  utility  patent 
requirements.  The statute was revised to provide that a 
patent  which  met  the  other  requirements  of  the  statute 
would not be invalid simply for failure to comply with the 
written  description  requirement  “if  the  description  is  as 
complete as is reasonably possible.”73  In 1930, no written 
description could have enabled creation of a plant, even if 
the  ancestry  and  techniques  of  cross-pollination  were 
69
6
. J.E.M. Ag  Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124 (2001); 35 
U.S.C. § 161, ¶ 2 (2000) (“The provisions of this title relating to patents 
for  inventions  shall  apply  to  patents  for  plants,  except  as  otherwise 
provided.”).
70
7
. 7  U.S.C.  §  2402(a)  (1994). The   Act  was  revised  in  1994  to 
conform to the 1991 UPOV convention, to which the U.S. is a signatory, 
see B. Koo, C. Nottenburg & P.G. Pardey, Plants and Intellectual Property: 
An International Appraisal, 306 SCIENCE 1295 (2004).
71 . Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 180 (1995).
72 . Pioneer  Hi-Bred  Int’l.  v.  DeKalb  Genetics,  51  U.S.P.Q.2d  1797, 
1799 (S.D. Iowa 1999);  see also MPEP, supra note 19, § 1601.
73 . Act of May 23, 1930, ch. 312, sec. 2, § 4888, 46 Stat. 376.  The 
comparable provision in the current statute is 35 U.S.C.  § 162 (2000), 
which  provides:  “No  plant  patent  shall  be  declared  invalid  for 
noncompliance  with  section  112  of  this  title  if  the  description  is  as 
complete as is reasonably possible.  The claim in the specification shall 
be in formal terms to the plant shown and described.”  The 35 U.S.C. § 
112 requirement of enablement is satisfied for plants if the disclosure in 
the application is as complete as is reasonably possible.  In re LeGrice, 
301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A.  1962).   The written description requirement of 
§112 is relaxed by § 162.  J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 127 (“To obtain a 
plant patent under § 161 a breeder must meet all of the requirements for 
§ 101, except for the description requirement.”).
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known—it  was  not  possible  to  produce the  plant  from a 
disclosure contemplated by 35 U.S.C. § 112 for other types 
of  manufactured  articles.  Thus,  a  reasonably  complete 
description  of  the  new plant  variety  is  all  that  could  be 
required.  In  addition,  a  patent  applicant  must  allege 
characteristics  that  distinguish  the  plant  from  similar 
varieties.74
The  general  utility  written  description  requirement 
serves several purposes, however.  Not only does it serve 
the  purpose  of  enabling  others  to  make  and  use  the 
invention  (the  purpose  Congress  thought  impossible  to 
meet), but it also serves to demonstrate that the invention 
has in fact been completed.  In  Bourne v Jones, the court 
recognized this  second purpose, holding that obtaining a 
plant  patent  requires  that  the  applicant:  (1)  invent  or 
discover  a  new  and  distinct  variety  of  plant  and  (2) 
asexually  reproduce  the  plant.75  Drawing  on  the  utility 
patent  requirement  that  an  invention  requires  a  mental 
step  (conception  of  the  invention),  and  a  physical  step 
(reduction to practice),76 the court held that an invention 
must be based on something definite and certain and, thus, 
in the plant patent context, the invention of a new plant 
variety was not complete until the plant was grown to the 
point  that  its  characteristics  could  be  determined;  one 
cannot  claim  a  plant  until  he  discovers  that  the 
characteristics described and claimed actually exist in the 
plant.   An  applicant  bears  the  burden  of  clearly  and 
precisely describing those characteristics which define the 
new variety as well as disclosing sufficient information to 
show that those characteristics are present in the plant and 
not in any other.
The  characteristics  that  may  distinguish  a  new  variety  would 
include, among others, those of habit; immunity from disease; or 
soil  conditions;  color  of  flower,  leaf,  fruit  or  stems;  flavor; 
productivity,  including  ever-bearing  qualities  in  case  of  fruits; 
storage  qualities;  perfume;  form;  and  ease  of  asexual 
74
7
. In re Greer, 484 F.2d 488 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
75 . Bourne v Jones, 114 F. Supp. 413 (D.C. Fla. 1951), aff’d 207 F.2d 
173 (5th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); accord In re Greer, 
484 F.2d 488.
76 . In addition, because an acceptable utility patent application must 
include  an  enabling  disclosure,  the  application  itself  is  considered  a 
constructive reduction to practice,  sufficient to complete the invention 
even  in  the  absence  of  a  physical  reduction  to  practice.   Frazer  v. 
Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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reproduction.  Within any one of  the above or  other  classes  of 
characteristics the differences which would suffice to make the 
variety  a  distinct  variety,  will  necessarily  be  differences  of 
degree.77
As  summarized  in  the  patent  office  regulations,  the 
patent  application  “must  contain  as  full  and  complete  a 
disclosure as possible of the plant and the characteristics 
thereof  that  distinguish  the  same  over  related  known 
varieties, and its antecedents, and must particularly point 
out  where  and in  what  manner  the  variety  of  plant  has 
been asexually  reproduced.”78  The regulations require a 
“detailed  botanical  description”79 and  a  single  claim80 
although the statute requires neither.
Specimens  of  the  plant,  or  its  flower  or  fruit,  in  a 
quantity and at a time in its stage of growth as may be 
designated, must be furnished, if  required, for study and 
inspection, although specimens “should not be submitted 
unless specifically called for by the examiner.”81
In  Ex  parte  Solomons,82 the  Patent  Office’s  Board  of 
Patent Appeals held that the deposit  of a specimen of  a 
microfungus  with  a  public  depository  satisfied  the  “as 
complete as is reasonably possible” requirement under 35 
U.S.C.  §  162.   More  typically,  however,  the  applicant 
addresses  the  disclosure  requirement  by  providing  a 
phenotypical description of selected characteristics of the 
plant,  and  such  descriptions  are  routinely  accepted 
provided  the  applicant  discloses  the  defining  physical 
characteristics  of  the  plant  and demonstrates  how those 
characteristics distinguish the plant from others.83
77
7
. S.  REP.  NO. 71-315,  at  4  (1930).  Cases  have  added  other 
characteristics to the list. See, e.g., Imazio Nursery v. Dania Greenhouses, 
69  F.3d  1560  (Fed.  Cir.  1995),  cert.  denied,  518  U.S.  1018  (1996) 
(resistance  to  cold,  drought,  heat,  wind,  or  soil  conditions);  Jessel  v. 
Newland,  195  U.S.P.Q.  678  (1977)  (resistance  to  cold,  drought,  heat, 
wind, or soil conditions).
78 . 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (a) (2006).
79 . 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (c)(9) (2006).
80
8
. 37 C.F.R. § 1.163 (c)(10) (2006).
81 . 37 C.F.R. § 1.166 (2006). There are similar rules requiring deposit 
of microorganisms related to patent applications.  If the applicant in a 
plant  case  has  in  fact  made  such  a  deposit,  that  may  solve  the 
enablement problem discussed in Part V. A., infra.
82 . 201 U.S.P.Q. 42 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1978).
83 . “[T]his  court,  recognizing  present  technological  limitations,  has 
concluded that there is no requirement for a how-to-make disclosure in a 
plant patent application.”  In re Greer, 484 F.2d 488, 491 (C.C.P.A. 1973) 
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C. THE PRIOR ART SOLUTION
Congress  did  not  specifically  address  the problem of 
identifying,  and  distinguishing  from,  prior  art  plants, 
leaving for the courts at least two questions: (1) on what 
basis would a plant be considered distinguished from other 
similar  plants  and  (2)  as  between  the  first  individual  to 
observe and the first individual to propagate, who would be 
considered the inventor?
The legislative history suggests a partial answer to the 
first question.  The Senate Report states: “In order for the 
new  variety  to  be  distinct  it  must  have  characteristics 
clearly distinguishable from those of existing varieties and 
it  is  immaterial  whether  in  the  judgment  of  the  Patent 
Office  the  new characteristics  are  inferior  or  superior  to 
those  of  existing  varieties.  Experience  has  shown  the 
absurdity  of  many  views  held  as  to  the  value  of  new 
varieties at the time of their creation.”84  This suggests a 
broad  range  of  distinguishing  characteristics  might  be 
acceptable,85 and subsequently issued patents indicate that 
the  patent  office  in  fact  accepts  a  broad  range  of 
characteristics.86 The Fifth Circuit defined “distinctness” as 
the aggregate of the plant’s distinguishing characteristics.87
(citing  In re  LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 944 (C.C.P.A.  1962)).  The court in 
Greer continued:
Nevertheless,  we  do  not  agree  that  it  was  contemplated  by 
Congress that its incorporation into R.S. 4888 of the matter which 
is the statutory predecessor to § 162 would operate to allow an 
applicant  to  allege  characteristics  which  might  be  capable  of 
distinguishing one variety of plant from another without sufficient 
disclosure  to  establish  that  these  characteristics  are  indeed 
present in the claimed plant and absent in the varieties to which 
it is most closely related. . . .
[I]f, as is true in this case, the characteristics chosen to define the 
new plant  are  meaningless  unless  compared  with  predecessor 
plant  varieties,  it  is  incumbent  upon  the  applicant  to  provide 
information of such a character that a meaningful comparison can 
be made.  It is our view that the Patent Office in this case was 
justified  in  its  conclusion that  the  criteria  used  to  support  the 
claim did not allow for such a meaningful comparison. . . .
Id.
84
8
. S. REP. NO. 71-315, at 4 (1930).
85 . See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
86 . See supra text accompanying notes 46–52 discussing color (e.g., 
U.S. Plant Pat. 8), flavor (e.g., U.S. Plant Pat.  47), hardiness (e.g.,  U.S. 
Plant  Pat.  99),  productiveness  (e.g.,  U.S.  Plant  Pat.  11),  and  keeping 
qualities (e.g., U.S. Plant Pat. 3).
87 . Yoder Bros. v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1378 (5th Cir. 
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The  answer  to  the  second  question  is  likewise 
suggested by the statutory requirement that “Any person 
who  has . . .  invented  or  discovered  and  asexually 
reproduced any  distinct  and  new  variety  of  plant . . . 
may . . . obtain a patent therefor.”88  The issue arose before 
the  patent  office’s  internal  Board  of  Patent  Appeals  and 
Interferences in  Ex parte Moore, where one individual had 
noticed a peach tree with unusual characteristics but did 
nothing  to  reproduce  it,  while  a  second  individual  (who 
noticed the unusual  characteristics  later)  propagated the 
tree  by  cuttings.89 The  court  noted  that  the  objective  of 
advancing  the  progress  of  science  and  useful  arts  was 
furthered  by  the  party  whose  actions  had  preserved  for 
posterity a variety that otherwise would have been lost and 
held that invention consisted of appreciating and asexually 
reproducing  the  new plant:  the  inventor  is  the  one  who 
appreciates  that  the  plant  is  new  and  propagates  it  by 
asexual reproduction.90
In the case where two individuals work together, one of 
whom propagates the plant asexually, without recognizing 
its special properties, and the second of whom recognizes 
its properties, they are joint inventors.  In Bourne v. Jones,91 
the court analogized the process of inventing a new plant 
with  that  of  inventing  a  new  chemical  compound  and 
concluded  that  the  plant  was  jointly  invented  by  the 
individual  who propagated a  series  of  sugar  cane plants 
and the individual who selected the one from the series to 
pursue and determined its characteristics:
Ordinarily,  invention  is  construed  to  mean  a  mental  operation 
involving  the  conception  of  an  idea,  and  a  physical  operation 
involving reduction to practice of the mental concept. . . . [F]rom 
the point of view of invention [of a plant],  we have a situation 
1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 1094 (1977).
88
8
. Act  of  May  23,  1930,  ch.  312,  sec.  1,  §  4886,  46  Stat.  376 
(emphasis  added).  The  comparable  provision  of  the  current  patent 
statute is found in 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2006): “Whoever invents or discovers 
and asexually reproduces any distinct and new variety of plant, including 
cultivated  sports,  mutants,  hybrids,  and  newly  found  seedlings,  other 
than . . .  a  plant  found  in  an  uncultivated  state,  may obtain  a  patent 
therefor . . . . (emphasis added).
89 . Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. 145 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1957).
90
9
. Ex parte Moore, 115 U.S.P.Q. at 147.
91 . 114  F.  Supp.  413  (D.  Fla  1951)  (finding joint  inventorship  and 
invalidating a patent since only one of the joint inventors was named in 
the application).
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remarkably similar to the situation involved in the invention of a 
chemical compound.  Because the properties or utilities of a new 
chemical  compound  cannot  be  definitely  determined  until  the 
compound has been produced and tested for utility, it is usually 
held in such cases that conception and reduction to practice are 
simultaneous acts taking place at the time the characteristics and 
the utility of the compound are isolated and identified . . . . [T]he 
inventor of a chemical compound is held to be the one who first, 
by  actual  test  or  practice,  determines  the  characteristics  and 
utility of the compound. A scientific prediction of the compound’s 
properties or utilities does not make the compound patentable.
The record is replete with expert opinion to the effect that only by 
tedious, repetitious tests can one be certain of the characteristics 
in a new variety of sugar cane . . . . Consequently, there could be 
no invention or  discovery of  these patented  varieties  of  sugar 
cane  prior  to  the  time  that  the  plants  were  grown  and  their 
characteristics  determined . . . .  One  could  not  claim  such  a 
patent until he “discovers” that the characteristics described and 
claimed for the plain under the patent exist in the plant.92
There  is  one  other  possibility  to  consider—the 
possibility  that  the  applicant’s  own  work  may  constitute 
prior  art,  because  the  inventor  delayed  filing  a  patent 
application long enough after disclosure of the invention to 
constitute a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  Under 
general  utility  patent  rules,  a  disclosure  constitutes  a 
statutory bar only if it is enabling.  The In re LeGrice court93 
held that a description of a patented rosa floribunda plant 
in a printed publication did not invalidate the patent since it 
was not enabling, even though it was the same plant. The 
mere  disclosure  of  a  photograph  and  description  of 
characteristics was held not to be enough to place a skilled 
artisan in possession of the invention.
D. THE CLAIM SOLUTION
Also related to the description issue is the problem of 
drafting  a  sufficiently  precise  claim  to  the  new  plant.94 
Congress solved this problem by eliminating it, creating a 
sui  generis claim  requirement  for  plants.   Plant  patent 
claims are governed by § 162 rather than the general claim 
requirements of § 112, and need only claim the plant “in 
92
9
. Id. at 418–19 (citations omitted).
93 . 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A.  1962).  While holding a photograph of  a 
rose bush insufficient to enable the plant, the decision explicitly left open 
the possibility that in some future case a printed publication might be 
enabling.
94 . Both issues arise under 35 U.S.C. §112 (2000).
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formal  terms  to  the  plant  shown and  described.”95  The 
patent office interprets this requirement as satisfied by a 
claim of the form “I claim the new and distinct variety of 
(fill  in  the species)  plant,  substantially  as  illustrated and 
described  herein”96 and  its  rules  provide  “under  no 
circumstances should the claim be directed to . . . fruit or 
flower in contradistinction to the plant bearing the flower or 
the tree bearing the fruit.”97
E. SUMMARY: THE PLANT PATENT REQUIREMENTS
Except  as  specifically  modified  by  the  PPA,  the 
requirements of the general utility statute apply.98 Thus, in 
order to receive a plant patent, an inventor must file an 
application with the U.S. Patent Office.99  The application is 
reviewed  by  a  patent  examiner  for  compliance  with  the 
patent  statute  which  requires  a  determination  that  the 
claimed subject matter:
1. is statutory subject matter, i.e., is a plant (within the 
commonly  understood  definition  of  the  word)  which  has 
been asexually reproduced;
2. was found in a cultivated state;
3. has been asexually reproduced;100
95
9
. 35 U.S.C. § 162 ¶ 2.  This provision was added in 1952.  Act of July 
19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 804.
96 . MPEP,  supra note  19, § 1605 final  ¶ (“An example of a proper 
claim  would  be  ‘A  new  and  distinct  variety  of  hybrid  tea  rose  plant, 
substantially as illustrated and described herein.’”).
97 . MPEP, supra note 19, § 1610 ¶ 2.
98 . 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2000).
99 . 35 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (2000).
100
1
. “Asexual  reproduction  occurs  by grafting,  budding,  or  the  like, 
and produces an offspring with a genetic combination identical to that of 
the single parent—essentially a clone.”  J.E.M. Ag  Supply v. Pioneer Hi-
bred  Int’l,  534  U.S.  124,  133  (2001).   In  Imazio  Nursery  v  Dania 
Greenhouses, 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995), reh’g en banc denied, 1996 
US  App  LEXIS  2464,  cert. denied,  116  S  Ct  2549,  the  court  defined 
asexual reproduction as isolation of a group or mass of vegetative cells 
from the parent  plant  that  are capable of  reproducing a  plant that  is 
genetically an exact duplicate of its parent plant, noting that Congress 
recognized that the asexual reproduction prerequisite greatly narrowed 
the  scope  of  protection  of  plant  patents  but  found  such  a  limitation 
necessary to ensure that the characteristics of the plant to be patented 
were maintained—asexual reproduction confirms the existence of a new 
variety  by  separating  variations  resulting  from  fluctuations  in 
environmental  conditions  from  true  plant  variations.   Post-1930 
technology has added options for  reliable  propagation of  true to  type 
plants  which  would  not  have  met  the  1930  definition  of  asexual 
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4. is distinguishable from other known plants;
5. is  described101 and illustrated  in  the application  in 
sufficient102 detail; and
6. is claimed in a sufficiently specific manner.103
The  theoretical  differences  between  utility  and  plant 
patents are summed up by the Fifth Circuit:
Normally,  the three requirements  for  patentability  are novelty, 
utility, and non-obviousness.  For plant patents, the requirement 
of  distinctness  replaces  that  of  utility,  and  the  additional 
requirement of asexual reproduction is introduced . . . The third 
requirement, nonobviousness, is the hardest to apply to plants. . . 
. The traditional three part test for obviousness, as set out in John 
Deere inquires as to (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) 
the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and 
(3) the level of ordinary skill in the prior art. . . . Rephrasing the 
John Deere tests for the plant world, we might ask about (1) the 
characteristics  of  prior  plants  of  the  same general  type,  both 
patented and nonpatented, and (2) the differences between the 
prior plants and the claims at issue. We see no meaningful way to 
apply the third criterion to plants—i.e. the level of ordinary skill in 
the  prior  art.   Criteria  one  and  two  are  reminiscent  of  the 
“distinctness” requirement already in the Plant Patent Act. Thus, 
if we are to give obviousness an independent meaning, it must 
refer  to  something  other  than  observable  characteristics.   We 
think that the most promising approach toward the obviousness 
requirement  for  plant  patents  is  reference  to  the  underlying 
constitutional standard that it codifies—namely, invention.104
Under the PPA 
an inventor—in principle—can obtain a patent on  any plant . . . 
reproduction, for example apomixis, which involves producing genetically 
identical plants from seeds.  Koltunow, Bicknell & Chaudhury,  Apomixis: 
Molecular  Strategies  for  the  Generation  of  Genetically  Identical  Seeds  
Without Fertilization, 108 PLANT PHYSIOL. 1345, 1345-52 (1995).
101
1
. Pan-American Plant  Co.  v.  Matsui,  433  F.  Supp.  693 (N.D.  Cal. 
1977) (disease resistance); Ex parte Rosenberg, 46 U.S.P.Q. 393 (Bd. Pat. 
App. & Interf. 1939) (difference in leaf texture and structure distinguished 
tobacco plant since flatter,  more uniform leaf was preferable for cigar-
wrapping purposes).
102 . The  Patent  Office  appears  to  have  been  satisfied  that  the 
sufficiency requirement was met, in the majority of recently issued plant 
patents, by reference to gross physical characteristics. Part IV. A.,  infra 
argues that, although this may be common practice, it does not meet the 
statutory requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000).
103 . Plant patent claims are formal and follow the formula: “I claim the 
new  and  distinct  variety  of  (fill  in  the  species)  plant  substantially  as 
illustrated and described herein.”  Thus, the sufficiency of the claim turns 
on the sufficiency of the illustration and description.
104 . Yoder Bros v. Cal.-Fla. Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1377-78 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted).
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that meets  three requirements.  It  must be distinct;  it  must be 
new; and on one or more occasions it must have been “asexually 
reproduced,”  e.g.,  reproduced  by  means  of  a  graft  .  .  .  the 
“asexual  reproduction”  requirement  sought  to  ensure  that  the 
inventor was capable of reproducing the new variety “asexually” 
(through  a  graft)  because  that  fact  would  guarantee  that  the 
variety’s  new  characteristics  had  genetic  (rather  that,  say, 
environmental) causes and would prove genetically stable over 
time.105
In holding that utility protection, as well as plant patent 
protection,  was  available  for  plants,  the  Supreme  Court 
noted:
Whatever Congress may have believed about the state of patent 
law and the science of plant breeding in 1930, plants have always 
had the  potential to fall  within the general  subject matter of § 
101, which is a dynamic provision designed to encompass new 
and unforeseen inventions. “A rule that unanticipated inventions 
are without protection would conflict with the core concept of the 
patent law that anticipation undermines patentability.”106
The Court’s analysis continued:
Petitioners essentially ask us to deny utility patent protection for 
sexually  reproduced plants because it  was unforeseen in 1930 
that such plants could receive protection under § 101. Denying 
patent protection under § 101 simply because such coverage was 
thought  technologically  infeasible  in  1930,  however,  would  be 
inconsistent  with  the  forward-looking  perspective  of  the  utility 
patent statute. As we noted in Chakrabarty, “Congress employed 
broad general language in drafting § 101 precisely because [new 
types of] inventions are often unforeseeable.”107
Between the Patent Office’s 1985 decision that plants 
qualified for  utility  patent  protection108 and the  Supreme 
Court’s  2001  decision  confirming  that  the  PPA  did  not 
preempt the utility statute,109 the PTO issued “some 1,800 
utility patents for plants.”110
F. THE INFRINGEMENT PRICE
Although  Congress  relaxed  several  disclosure 
standards  for  plants,  it  also  modified  the  definition  of 
infringement from a prohibition of manufacture, use or sale 
105
1
. J.E.M. Ag  Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 150 (2001) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
106 . Id. at 135 (internal citations omitted).
107 . Id. (internal citations omitted).
108 . Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q. 443, (Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1985).
109 . J.E.M. Ag  Supply, 534 U.S. 124.
110 . Id. at 145.
MAX STUL OPPENHEIMER, "THE 'REASONABLE PLANT' TEST: WHEN PROGRESS OUTRUNS THE CONSTITUTION," 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 417-452 (2008).
438 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
of  a  product  embodying  the  claimed  invention  to  “the 
exclusive  right  to  asexually  reproduce  the  plant.”111  As 
explained  by  the  Supreme  Court,  “The  PPA  thus  gave 
patent protection to breeders who were previously unable 
to overcome the obstacles described in  Chakrabarty” but 
the protection was limited to asexually-reproduced plants, 
the only type which could be reproduced true-to-type at the 
time.112
A question remained as to whether the exclusive right 
to asexually reproduce “the” plant limited infringement to 
plants  derived  from the  original  plant  which  formed  the 
basis for the patent, or extended to any plant which had 
the characteristics claimed in the patent.
The prevailing view is that to establish infringement of 
a plant patent, the patentee must prove that the alleged 
infringing plant is an asexually reproduced progeny of  the 
patented  plant113 and  that  the  infringement  is  complete 
when the propagation takes place—it is not necessary for 
the infringing plant to have reached maturity.114 This view 
111
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 163 (2000).
112 . J.E.M.  Ag   Supply,  534  U.S.  at  134.  “All  such  plants  must  be 
asexually reproduced in order to have their identity preserved.  This is 
necessary since seedlings either of chance or self-pollenization from any 
of these would not preserve the character of the individual.” S.  REP. NO. 
71-315, at 3 (1930).
113 . Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321 
(E.D. Wash. 2006).
In the present case, I am of the view that not only has the 
plaintiff failed to prove by clear and convincing proof that the 
trees grown by the defendant are an infringement upon his 
patent but that, on the contrary, there is ample proof to show 
that the trees grown by the plaintiff were a sport or mutation 
of  the  Le  Grand  tree.  This  conclusion  is  not  in  any  way 
weakened by the testimony in the record given by a  well-
known  scientist  in  the  field  of  genetics  that  sports  or 
mutations in the nectarine field are rare.
Kim Bros. v. Hagler, 167 F. Supp. 665, 669 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff’d 276 F.2d 
259 (9th Cir. 1960). “Conceding that the plants of the plaintiff and of the 
defendants  have  similar  characteristics,  the  proof  is  not  clear  and 
convincing that the plaintiff  must have appropriated plants or cuttings 
belonging  to  [plaintiff]  or  his  assignee.”  Cole  Nursery  Co.  v.  Youdath 
Perennial Gardens, 17 F. Supp. 159, 160 (N.D. Ohio 1936).  But see Pan-
American Plant Co. v. Matsui, 433 F. Supp. 693 (N.D. Cal 1977) (holding 
that a plant could infringe even though not a clone of the plant claimed in 
the patent).
114 . Yoder  v.  Cal.-Fla.  Plant,  537  F.2d  1347  (5th  Cir.  1976),  cert.  
denied. 429 U.S. 1094 (1977). (“On cross appeal, Cal-Florida asserts that 
the absence of flowering plants grown from the cuttings it had admittedly 
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is  also logically consistent with the 1930s view that only 
asexual  propagation  assured preservation  of  the claimed 
character-istics.115 Thus, to the extent that the description 
of  physical  characteristics  represented  a  technologically 
imposed  relaxation  of  the  disclosure  and  enablement 
requirements  of  utility  patent  law,  there  is  an  offsetting 
compensation  through  the  infringement  provisions—the 
plant  is  not  described  well  enough  to  enable  others  to 
independently make it, so if they do independently make it, 
it  is  not  infringement.  In  Imazio  Nursery  v  Dania 
Greenhouses,116 the Federal Circuit specifically recognized 
a  defense  of  independent  creation,  holding  that 
notwithstanding  proof  of  the  defendant’s  asexual 
reproduction of a plant having the same characteristics as 
the  patented  plant,  the  plain  meaning  of  the  statute 
required  asexual  reproduction  of  the  patented  plant  for 
there  to  be  infringement,  and  rejecting  the  trial  court’s 
concern  that  the  “patent  holder  would  have  great 
difficulties enforcing his patent rights if a defendant were 
allowed  to  raise  independent  creation  as  an  affirmative 
defense.”117
This view also produces an internally consistent fiction. 
Patentable plants are limited to those produced by asexual 
taken  from Yoder’s  patented  plants  was  fatal  to  Yoder’s  infringement 
counts.  This is because the patent  claim in each instance describes a 
mature flowering plant, and it is Cal-Florida’s position that only another 
mature flowering plant could directly infringe . . . . We agree with Yoder 
that it was not necessary to prove that the cuttings actually matured into 
flowered  plants  to  show infringement.  Under  such a  rule,  it  would  be 
virtually  impossible  for  a  propagator-distributor  directly  to  infringe  a 
patent,  despite  the  vital  role  he  plays  in  dissemination  of  plant 
material.”).
115
1
. Congress recognized that  the asexual  reproduction prerequisite 
greatly narrowed the scope of protection of plant patents but found such 
a limitation necessary to ensure that the characteristics of the plant to be 
patented  were  maintained,  since  asexual  reproduction  confirms  the 
existence  of  a  new  variety  by  separating  variations  resulting  from 
fluctuations  in  environmental  conditions  from  true  plant  variations. 
Imazio  Nursery  v  Dania  Greenhouses,  69  F.3d  1560  (Fed.  Cir.  1995), 
reh’g en banc, denied, 1996 US App LEXIS 2464, cert. denied, 116 S Ct 
2549.
116 . 69 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995),  reh’g, en banc, denied, 1996 US 
App LEXIS 2464, cert denied, 116 S Ct 2549; see also Van Well Nursery v. 
Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1321 (E.D. Wash. 2006).
117 . The district court was concerned that it would be difficult for the 
patentee to refute a defense of independent creation since the critical 
evidence would be in the alleged infringer’s control.
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propagation  since  this  assures  that  the  progeny  will  be 
identical  to  the parent  plant  and thus will,  by definition, 
assure  that  each  of  the  progeny  will  have  the 
characteristics  claimed to  distinguish the patented plant. 
“Since a cutting is genetically identical to the parent plant, 
it will develop into a plant whose characteristics match the 
parent’s  exactly,  so  long  as  the  same  environmental 
conditions  obtain.”118 It  is  internally  consistent  that  if 
“asexual  reproduction  is  literally  the  only  way  that  a 
breeder can be sure he has reproduced a plant identical in 
every respect to the parent”119 then the only way to be sure 
that  an  infringement  has  taken  place  is  to  tie  it  to  the 
original, patented, plant.
IV. THE PROBLEM: 17,000 INVALID PATENTS?
Others  have  called  for  revisions  to  the  plant  patent 
statute, to provide greater clarity and stronger protection 
for  genetic  inventions.120 In  fact,  “a  special  Presidential 
Commission,  noting  the  special  problems  that  plant 
protection raised and favoring the development of a totally 
new plant protection scheme, had recommended that ‘all 
provisions  in  the  patent  statute  for  plant  patents  be 
deleted . . . .’”121
If  the requirement of § 161 is read literally,  so as to 
require  an  applicant  for  a  plant  patent  to  provide  a 
“reasonably  complete”  description  of  the  claimed  plant, 
then applications which do not do so should not be granted 
and those which are granted should be declared invalid. 
Given the advances in plant technology described below,122 
it  would  appear  that  applications  should  have  begun 
including genetic descriptions in lieu of (or in addition to) 
physical  characteristics,  possibly  as  early  as  1960  but 
118
1
. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929 (C.C.P.A. 1962); accord Yoder v. Calif-
Fla. Plant, 537 F.2d 1347, 1352 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 US 1094 
(1977).
119 . Yoder, 537 F.2d 1347, 1380.
120 . See, e.g., Christopher E. James, Note, The Impact on Agricultural  
Research  by  Genetic  Material  Patents  and  the  Need  for  Clarity  and 
Reform in Patent Law for Genetic Material, 11 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 253 (2006).
121 . J.E.M. Ag  Supply v. Pioneer Hi-bred Int’l, 534 U.S. 124, 150 (2001) 
(Breyer,  J.,  dissenting)  (citing  President’s  Commission  on  the  Patent 
System, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, S. DOC. NO. 90-5, at 20–21 
(1967)).
122 . See  infra Part IV. B.
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certainly  beginning by 2000.   A  review of  a sampling of 
plant  patents  indicates  that  this  has  not  happened. 
Whether this means that roughly 17,000 plant patents are 
invalid depends on analysis of several issues:
1. Does  the  statute  freeze  “reasonableness”  on  the 
date of enactment in 1930 (or recodification in 1952), or is 
it  a  contemporary  standard,  advancing  as  technology 
advances?
2. If  the  standard  is  contemporary,  has  it  changed 
since 1930 (and if so, what is it now)?
3. Is  there  a  policy  reason,  based  on  administrative 
impossibility,  which  precludes  examining  patent 
applications  which  are  based  on  genetic,  rather  than 
physical characteristic, descriptions?
4. Is there a policy reason, based on a desire not to 
invalidate essentially every plant patent issued in the last 
decade  or  two,  to  ignore  technological  advances  since 
1930?
A. DID THE PPA FREEZE THE STANDARD FOR DISCLOSURE AS OF ENACTMENT?
Section 162 absolves applicants for plant patents of the 
duty to provide an enabling disclosure of their inventions if 
“the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.” 
The provision was first enacted in 1930 and most recently 
considered in the 1952 recodification of the patent statute. 
Could  Congress  have  intended  to  set,  and  freeze,  the 
standard for reasonable possibility at either of those dates? 
Such an  interpretation  seems highly  unlikely,  for  several 
reasons.   First,  when  Congress  recodified  the  statute  in 
1952, it did not indicate in the legislative history that it was 
also  “resetting  the  clock”  with  respect  to  plant  patent 
disclosure  requirements—if  the  statute  was  intended  to 
freeze the standard, one would expect such a statement. 
Furthermore,  the  patent  statute  is  the  vehicle  for 
motivating technological progress and it would seem odd 
that  a  technology-motivating  statute  would  freeze  its 
standards for invention at a specific point in time.
In fact,  two of  the more common activities of patent 
examiners  in  reviewing applications  are an evaluation of 
the claimed invention  in  comparison with  the prior  art123 
and (for utility patents) an evaluation of the sufficiency of 
123
1
. The comparison is mandated by 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 & 103 (2000).
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the disclosure.124  Both evaluations are made as of a then-
current  date,  not  the  date  when  the  relevant  statutory 
sections were enacted.  While the issue does not appear to 
have  been  raised,  the  J.E.M.125 case  arguably  provides 
inferential  support  for  the  contemporary  technology 
standard, since it holds the 1930 Congress’ incorrect belief, 
based  on  1930  technology,  irrelevant  to  the  issue  of 
preemption.126
It is no answer that, at the time of enactment, Congress 
did not foresee the genetic breakthroughs of the late 20th 
century.  As the Supreme Court has noted:
Denying  patent  protection  under  §  101  simply  because  such 
coverage  was  thought  technologically  infeasible  in  1930, 
however,  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  forward-looking 
perspective  of  the  utility  patent  statute.  As  we  noted  in 
Chakrabarty,  “Congress  employed  broad  general  language  in 
drafting § 101 precisely because [new types of]  inventions are 
often unforeseeable.”127
In J.E.M., the Court noted that although the legislative 
history  of  the  Plant  Patent  Act  suggests  a  general 
perception  existed  in  1930  that  plants  could  not  be 
patented:
“[t]his does not mean, however, that prior to 1930 plants could 
not  have  fallen  within  the  subject  matter  of  §  101.  Rather,  it 
illustrates only that in 1930 Congress  believed that plants were 
not patentable under § 101, both because they were living things 
and  because  in  practice  they  could  not  meet  the  stringent 
description requirement. Yet these premises were disproved over 
time. As this Court held in Chakrabarty, “the relevant distinction” 
for purposes of § 101 is not “between living and inanimate things, 
but  between  products  of  nature,  whether  living  or  not,  and 
human-made  inventions.”  In  addition,  advances  in  biological  
knowledge and breeding expertise have allowed plant breeders 
to satisfy § 101’s demanding description requirement.128
The  emphasized  language  makes  clear  that,  while  the 
statutory  language  regarding  the  level  of  disclosure 
required for a plant patent has not changed, the state of 
scientific  knowledge  has—this  change  in  scientific 
knowledge  translates  into  a  heightened  requirement  for 
patentability. This is not an unusual occurrence in patent 
124
1
. The  requirement  for  an  adequate  description  for  utility 
applications is mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
125 . J.E.M. Ag  Supply, 534 U.S. 124.
126 . See supra notes 30–38 and accompanying text.
127 . J.E.M. Ag  Supply, 534 U.S. at 135 (internal citations omitted).
128 . Id. at 134 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
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law.  The  general  standard  for  patentability  is  set  by 
reference to the then-current state of the art.  The normal 
course  of  scientific  progress  dictates  that   discoveries 
which are astonishing and patentable in one era become 
commonplace  and therefore  unpatentable  in  a  later  era. 
While J.E.M. was concerned with patentability under § 101, 
the same argument applies to § 162, which exempts plant 
patents from the written description requirement of § 112 
only  “if  the  description  is  as  complete  as  is  reasonably 
possible.”129  As  scientific  advances  have  made  more 
complete  descriptions  “reasonably  possible,”  the  statute 
requires applicants to provide them.
Thus, many issued plant patents are invalid for failure 
to meet the “do your best” requirement, because of natural 
developments which resulted in changes to what is “best.”
The above analysis indicates that there is an evolving 
standard  of  reasonableness,  but  only  because  Congress 
has chosen it. There does not appear to be a Constitutional 
mandate  that  the  standard  must  continue  to  evolve.130 
Thus, if this is not the result Congress wants, it could clarify 
the  statute  to  set  a  fixed  date  for  determining  the 
adequacy of plant patent disclosures. It could also provide 
a  dividing  line,  possibly  even  a  grace  period  allowing 
pending applications to be examined under one standard 
but future applications to be evaluated under a different 
standard.
B. WHAT IS THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ART IN REASONABLENESS?
If  the  standard  for  reasonableness  progresses  along 
with the progress of the relevant technology, it  becomes 
important to establish how that standard has evolved from 
1930 to the present, and how to determine the standard at 
any particular time.
When the PPA was enacted in 1930,  Mendel’s theory of 
genetics was well-accepted, having gone through a period 
of  doubt  but  then  rehabilitated,  and  dictated  that  only 
129
1
. 35 U.S.C. § 162 (2000) (“No plant patent shall be declared invalid 
for noncompliance with § 112 of this title if the description is as complete 
as is reasonably possible.”) .
130 . One can construct an argument that motivating progress requires 
a “moving statutory target” in order to assure that a point will not be 
reached where no further progress is possible.  The argument does not 
seem compelling.
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asexual  propagation  would  assure  true-to-type 
reproduction  of  the  physical  characteristics  of  a  plant; 
sexual propagation would result in hybrids, some of which 
would resemble one parent, some of which would resemble 
the  other  parent  and  some  of  which  would  resemble 
neither.  While  it  was  understood  that  genetics  played  a 
controlling  role  in  determining  those  characteristics,  the 
connection between DNA and genetics was unknown. The 
standard for describing and categorizing plants was based 
on  observable  physical  characteristics—the  phenotype 
which was the result of the then unobservable genetic code 
which produced it.
It  was not  until  1935 that  Andrei  Belozersky isolated 
DNA.  The structure (as opposed to chemical composition) 
of DNA remained a puzzle until James Watson and Francis 
Crick discovered its double helical structure131 and reported 
it in  Nature in 1953.  They received the 1962 Nobel Prize 
for the discovery.  Starting in the mid-1960’s, efforts were 
made  to  distinguish  plants  based  on  chemical 
components.132  The manner in  which  the  DNA molecule 
controlled the production of amino acids was discovered by 
Marshall  Nirenberg  in  1966.   David  Botstein  discovered 
that, when the DNA from different people was cut using a 
restriction enzyme, certain of the resulting fragments had 
different  lengths.133  The  reliability  of  the  technology  in 
identifying individuals as the source of a DNA sample was 
accepted in a U.S. criminal case in 1987.134  A conviction 
based on DNA evidence was affirmed by a state court of 
131
1
. The discovery was made on February 28, 1953.
132 . “During the last 40 years, there has been sustained interest in the 
ability to identify individual hop varieties by the essential oil and resin 
components . . . Since 1982, the composition of essential oils has been 
studied at the Institute for Hop Research and Brewing Zalec. . .”  Cerenak 
et.  al.,  Identification and Differentiation of  Hop Varieties  Using Simple 
Sequence Repeat Markers, 62 J. AM. SOC. BREW CHEM. 1 (2004).  However, 
“[i]t was shown that the organoleptic evaluation is fairly subjective. . .” 
Id.
133 . The  fragments  are  referred  to  as  Restriction  Fragment  Length 
Polymorphisms (RFLPs) and, with the addition of genetic enhancement 
techniques,  such  as  PCR,  became  the  basis  for  “DNA  fingerprinting” 
(invented  by  Alec  Jeffreys  in  1984).   An  alternative  identification 
technology,  Expressed  Sequence  Tags  (ESTs)  was  at  the  center  of 
controversy when, in 1997,  the patent office announced that it  would 
consider patents for ESTs.
134 . Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
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last resort in 1989.135  In December, 1999,  Nature carried 
the news of completion of the first complete DNA sequence 
of a plant chromosome,136 which was followed a year later 
with  the  “cracking”  of  the  human  genetic  code.137 
Researchers  have  continued  to  sequence  other  plant 
species’  DNA  using  a  variety  of  techniques.138  In  the 
comparable area of patents for gene sequences, there has 
been dramatic growth.  Between 1980 and 2000, just 2,000 
patents  were  issued  for  gene  and  gene  sequences. 
Recently,  more  than  70,000  applications  were  pending 
before  the  United  States  Patent  and  Trademark  Office 
(USPTO) for similar patents.139
135
1
. State v. Woodall, 385 S.E.2d 253 (W. Va. 1989).
136 . K. Mayer et al.,  Sequence and Analysis of Chromosome 4 of the 
Plant Arabidopsis Thaliana,  402  NATURE 769 (1999);  Xiaoying Lin et al., 
Sequence  and  Analysis  of  Chromosome  2  of  the  Plant  Arabidopsis 
Thaliana,  402  NATURE 761  (1999).  A  press  release  was  issued  by  the 
National Science Foundation’s Office of Legislative and Public Affairs on 
December 15, 1999; the Nature article appeared on December 16. Press 
Release,  Nat’l  Sci.  Found.,  Scientists  Report  First  Complete  DNA 
Sequence  of  Plant  Chromosomes,  (Dec.  15,  1999),   available  at 
http://www.nsf.gov/pubs/2000/pr9973/pr9973.txt.  An  earlier  advance 
toward the complete sequence was reported in 1993. Holte et.  al.,  An 
Inventory  of  1152  Expressed  Sequence  Tags  Obtained  from  Partial  
Sequencing of cDNAs from Arabidopsis Thaliana, 4  PLANT J. 1051 (1993) 
(“these results underscore the efficiency with which new plant genes can 
be identified through partial sequencing of anonymous DNAs”). 
137 . The first  plant chromosome completed was Arabidosis thaliana, 
which  has  an  approximately  125  Megabase  genome.  In  contrast,  the 
human genome consists of roughly 3 billion base pairs.
138 . See,  e.g.,  Slightom et.  al.,  Complete Nucleotide Sequence of  a 
French Bean  Storage  Protein  Gene:  Phaseolin,  80  PROC.  NAT’L ACAD.  SCI. 
1897 (1983); Theologis, et. al.,  Sequence Analysis of Chromosome 1 of 
the Plant Arabadopsis Thaliana, 408  NATURE 816 (2000); Cerenak et. al., 
Identification and Differentiation of Hop Varieties Using Simple Sequence 
Repeat  Markers,  J.  AM.  SOC.  BREW CHEM. 1  (2004)  (“Randomly  amplified 
polymorphic  DNA  (RAPD),  sequenced  tag  sites  (STS)  markers,  and 
microsatellites have been used to some extent for identity typing and hop 
cultivar identification.”). Citing RAPD studies from 1991 and 1994, an STS 
study from 1998 and microsatellite studies from 1996 and 2001, Cerenak 
et  al.  report  that  “five  polymorphic  microsatellites  are  capable  of 
differentiating among all culivars included, except cultivars derived from 
clonal selection, polyploidy, or mutations.”  Id. at 7. Bausher, et. al., The 
Complete Chloroplast Genome Sequence of Citrus Sinensis (L.) Osbeck 
var  ‘Ridge  Pineapple’:  Organization  and  Phylogenetic  Relationships  to  
Other Angiosperms, 6  BMC PLANT BIOLOGY 21 (2006) (comparing DNA and 
EST sequences). “We have sequenced the  Citrus chloroplast genome to 
facilitate genetic improvement of this crop.” Id.
139 . James, supra note 120, at 256.
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C. TWO CONSEQUENCES FOLLOW
The  rationale  for  limiting  plant  patents  to  asexual 
reproduction  is  explained  in  the  Senate  Report 
accompanying the bill: “All such plants must be asexually 
reproduced in order to have their identity preserved. This is 
necessary  since  seedlings  either  of  chance  or  self-
pollenization  from  any  of  these  would  not  preserve  the 
character of the individual.”140  Post-1930 technology has 
added  options  for  reliable  propagation  of  true-to-type 
plants  which  would  not  have  met  the  1930 definition  of 
asexual  reproduction,  for  example apomixis,  a  technique 
for producing genetically identical plants from the seeds of 
certain  types  of  plants.141  In  fact,  apomixis  may  offer 
advantages  over  vegetative  propagation:  “Clonal  seed 
would  help  avoid  costly  and  time-consuming  vegetative 
propagation methods that are currently used to ensure the 
large  scale  production  of  these  crops.”142  Research  is 
underway to develop techniques for enabling apomixis in 
plants which do not have the capability naturally.143 Thus, 
the  first  consequence  is  that  the  range  of  reproduction 
techniques  covered  by  the  PPA  must  be  expanded  to 
include  modern  techniques,  and  not  be  limited  to 
techniques considered by the 1930 Congress.
The  second  consequence  which  follows  is  that  the 
emerging  standard  of  disclosure  has  undergone  several 
changes since 1930.  While there may be legitimate debate 
over the exact date when a particular change occurred, it is 
clear  that  sometime after  the mid-1960’s,  at  least  some 
plant patent applications (those which claimed distinction 
from  the  prior  art  based  on  such  factors)  should  have 
provided chemical analyses of the claimed plant and of the 
nearest prior art plants.144  It is also clear that sometime 
140
1
. S.  REP. NO. 71-315, at 3 (1930). Asexual propagation “is a term 
applied  to  the  propagation  of  plants  from parts  other  than  seeds  or 
spores.”  MONTAGUE FREE, PLANT PROPAGATION IN PICTURES 53 (1957).
141 . Anna  M.  Koltunow,  Ross  A.  Bicknell,  &  Abdul  M.  Chaudhury, 
Apomixis: Molecular Strategies for the Generation of Genetically Identical  
Seeds Without Fertilization, 108 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1345 (1995).
142 . Id. at 1346.
143 . Id. at 1351.
144 . “During the last 40 years, there has been sustained interest in the 
ability to identify individual hop varieties by the essential oil and resin 
components . . . Since 1982, the composition of essential oils has been 
studied  at  the  Institute  for  Hop  Research  and  Brewing  Zalec  .  . . .” 
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after  the  December,  1999,  Nature article  reporting  a 
complete  DNA  sequence  of  a  plant  chromosome  and 
subsequent  perfection  of  other  DNA-based  plant 
identification techniques,145 the standard would require that 
a  plant  patent  application  include  disclosure  of  DNA 
sequences.
D. CAN THE SYSTEM HANDLE VALID DISCLOSURES?
 Notwithstanding the above analysis, it would make no 
sense to require a type of disclosure which the patent office 
was  incapable  of  evaluating.   One  of  the  challenges  for 
examination of plant patent applications is the difficulty of 
finding  relevant  prior  art.   Under  the  1930  “physical 
characteristic” standard, the problem is identifying prior art 
plants and comparing sometimes subjective characteristics; 
under a 21st century DNA based standard, the problem will 
be locating appropriate  databases and a language which 
facilitates comparison.  The statute (and President Hoover’s 
executive  order)  provided  for  the  assistance  of  the 
Department  of  Agriculture,146 which  presumably  has 
expertise in both areas.  Databases which are well-suited to 
this type of analysis are already maintained by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH).147
Cerenak et. al., supra note 138, at 1. However, “[i]t was shown that the 
organoleptic evaluation is fairly subjective . . .” Id.
145
1
. See  Press  Release,  Nat’l  Sci.  Found.,  Scientists  Report  First 
Complete  DNA  Sequence  of  Plant  Chromosomes,  (Dec.  15,  1999), 
available  at http://  www.nsf.gov/pubs/2000/pr9973/pr9973.txt.  Earlier 
dates are also arguable: 1993, the date of the Holte article in The Plant 
Journal,  supra note  136;  1988,  the  date  when  Andrews was  decided, 
supra note  134;  or  1989,  when the appellate court acknowledged the 
reliability  of  DNA  testing  in  Woodall,  supra note  135,  or  some 
“reasonable” period of time following each of these events.
146 . In re Greer, 484 F.2d 488, 489 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“In conformance 
with the usual  procedure for  the examination of  applications for  plant 
patents,  the  application  was  submitted  by  the  Patent  Office  to  the 
Department of Agriculture for its evaluation of the assertions made in the 
specification supporting the claim that the grass was a distinct and new 
variety of plant. In due course a report was provided by the Department 
of Agriculture to the Patent Office . . . .”).
147 . One example is the BLAST program, which provides a library of 
known  DNA  and  related  sequences  and  software  for  entering  a  new 
sequence and determining whether a similar one already exists in the 
database. See, e.g., National Center for Biotechnology Information, Basic 
Local  Alignment  Search  Tool  (BLAST), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/blast/Blast.cgi?CMD=Web 
&PAGE_TYPE=BlastHome (last visited Mar. 15, 2008).
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Moreover, this is a challenge of a type which the USPTO 
has  faced  successfully  before.   In  1996,  Commissioner 
Lehman reported  on  the  administrative  aftermath  of  the 
Supreme Court’s Chakrabarty decision: “For over a decade, 
the PTO has been examining and granting patents to claims 
reciting  nucleic  acid  sequences.”148  The  most  recent 
challenge  to  the  PTO’s  ingenuity  in  examining  new 
technologies  was  the  Federal  Circuit’s  decision  in  State 
Street  Bank.149 In  response  to  that  decision,  which  held 
business  method  patents  statutory,  the  PTO  tripled  the 
number of examiners assigned to the field and identified 
new  databases  to  be  searched  in  determining 
patentability.150 There was a learning curve, manifested in a 
longer than  average delay  in  initially  acting  on business 
method patents while the PTO adjusted, but by the end of 
2001  the  average  pendency  of  a  business  method 
application  was  within  three  months  of  the  overall  PTO 
average.151  Thus, the PTO faces a problem of execution, 
148
1
. Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Sec’y of Commerce and the Comm’r 
of Patents and Trademarks, Public Hearing on Patenting of Nucleic Acid 
Sequences (Apr. 23, 1996) (transcript available at http://www.uspto.gov/
web/ offices/com/sol/notices/seq-hear.txt).
149 . State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, 149 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
150 . U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, A USPTO WHITE PAPER: AUTOMATED FINANCIAL  
OR MANAGEMENT DATA PROCESSING METHODS (BUSINESS METHODS) 9–21  (2000), 
available  at http://www.uspto.gov/web/  menu/busmethp/index.html.  In 
the two years from the Federal Circuit decision to the publication of the 
White Paper, the PTO had increased the number of examiners in Class 
705 from twelve to thirty-eight and reported that “Seventeen of the 38 
examiners have advanced or multiple degrees. Of these 4 have an MBA 
or other business degrees, 4 have a JD degree, 4 have Ph.D. degrees, and 
7  have  Masters  Degrees.”  Id.  at  14.  The  PTO  had  also  identified 
databases of non-patent literature (NPL) which examiners are to consult 
in addition to searching the patent database,  including Dialog and the 
Software Patent Institute and the IEEE/IEE Electronic Library databases. 
Id. at 21.  See also U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Business Methods Still 
Experiencing Substantial  Growth—Report of Fiscal  year 2001 Statistics, 
http://www.uspto.  gov/web/menu/pbmethod/fy2001strport.html  (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2008).
151 . “The average pendency to first action in Class 705 is 23.5 months. 
This can be compared to an average pendency to first  action of  14.6 
months  for  the  entire  USPTO.   The  average  time  to  disposal  is  28.5 
months  in  Class  705.  This  can  be  compared  to  an  average  time  to 
disposal of 25.6 months for the entire USPTO.” U.S. Patent & Trademark 
Office, Business Methods Still Experiencing Substantial Growth—Report of 
Fiscal  year  2001  Statistics, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/pbmethod/fy2001strport.html  (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2008).
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not  theory.   In  addition,  it  has  tools  at  its  disposal  to 
facilitate execution and can draw on expertise from other 
agencies, such as the Department of Agriculture, the Food 
and Drug Administration and the NIH.
E. CAN THE SYSTEM TOLERATE INVALIDATING 17,000 PATENTS?
Notwithstanding the statutory command and the ability 
of the responsible agency to carry it out, the consequent 
invalidity  of  a  large  number  of  patents  is  a  factor  to 
consider.  It would be awkward for a system designed to 
promote  progress  by  providing  economic  incentives  to 
deprive innovators of that incentive on a wholesale basis. 
One answer would be that the core principles of patent law 
require an exchange: the economic incentive is provided, 
not for innovation,  but for disclosure—if  the disclosure is 
inadequate,  the  incentive  has  not  been  earned.   The 
problem is  not  completely  unanticipated—it  has  at  least 
been hinted at in early cases:
While the present knowledge of plant genetics may mean as a 
practical  matter,  that  the  descriptions  in  such  general 
publications  as  are  here  involved  cannot  be  relied  upon  as  a 
statutory  bar . . .  we  must  be  mindful  of  the  scientific  efforts 
which are daily adding to the store of knowledge in the fields of 
plant heredity and plant eugenics  which one skilled in this art will 
be  presumed  to  possess . . . .  Current  studies  to  “break  the 
chromosome  code”  may  also  add  to  the  knowledge  of  plant 
breeders so that they may someday secure possession of a plant 
invention  by  a  description  in  a  printed  publication  as  is  now 
possible in other fields of inventive effort.152
Fortunately,  there  are  avenues  for  accomplishing  both 
objectives:  rescuing  many  of  the  patents  that  would 
otherwise be invalid, and obtaining the disclosure.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF A 21st CENTURY APPROACH
A. WHAT CAN BE DONE FOR EXISTING PATENTS AND APPLICATIONS?
What can be done to “save” invalid plant patents, and 
pending  applications  that  cannot  lead  to  a  valid  patent, 
depends  on  the  stage  the  applicant  has  reached. 
Applications  which  have  not  yet  been  filed  offer  the 
greatest  chance  for  validity,  followed  by  pending 
152
1
. In re LeGrice, 301 F.2d 929, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (internal footnote 
omitted).
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applications,  patents issued less than two years ago and 
finally patents issued more than two years ago.
1. Unfiled Applications
Unfiled applications offer the greatest opportunity for 
producing  a  valid  patent.   Those  applications  can  be 
drafted to include a distinguishing genetic sequence or can 
be supported by a deposit of genetic material in a publicly 
accessible facility.
2. Pending Applications
Those applications which include genetic sequences, or 
which included a deposit of a sample of the plant, comply 
with the requirements of disclosure and need do nothing 
further.  Those which do not face the problem that, as filed, 
the  application  is  insufficient.  Once  an  application  for  a 
patent  has been filed,  the ability  to  amend it  is  limited: 
changes  may  be  made,  but  “new  matter”  may  not  be 
added. However, with respect to plant patents, an internal 
patent office rule provides
if the written description is deficient, “a clarification or additional 
description of the plant, or even a wholesale substitution of the 
original  description  so  long  as  not  totally  inconsistent  and 
unrelated to the original description and photograph of the plant 
may be submitted in reply to an Office action.”  Such submission 
will not constitute new matter . . .153
Thus,  many  pending  applications  can  be  saved  by 
providing additional description of the plant, consisting of 
appropriate  DNA  sequence  information.  This  could  be 
facilitated (and the argument for validity strengthened) if 
the patent office requested such clarification in an office 
action.  Alternatively,  the patent office could exercise its 
authority to request specimens of the plant.
3. Issued Patents: Less than Two Years Out
The  patent  statute  permits  a  patentee  to  request  a 
broadening reissue within two years from the issue date of 
the patent.   Patentees in this  category could  file  such a 
request and follow the procedure outlined above.
153
1
. MPEP,  supra note  19,  §  1605  (citing  Jessel  v.  Newland,  195 
U.S.P.Q. 678, 684 (Dep. Comm’r Pat. 1977)) (emphasis added).
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4. Issued Patents: More than Two Years Out
There does not appear to be any procedure under the 
current  statute for  “rescuing” patents  which were issued 
more than two years ago.  Moreover, given the number of 
patents  which  might  be  saved  under  one  of  the  above 
procedures, the policy reasons for facilitating their rescue, 
and  the  burden  that  thousands  of  amendments  and 
requests for reissue would place on patent office resources, 
Congress  might  well  want  to  solve  the  problem 
legislatively. It could, for example,  amend the statute to 
provide  a  future  effective  date  for  specifically  requiring 
genetic information, while grandfathering applica-tions filed 
before that date.
B. REDEFINING WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
The written description requirement has two roles with 
respect to patents: description and enablement.  Including 
a  DNA  sequence  not  only  provides  a  contemporary 
description  which  is  better  than  the  historical  physical 
description,  but  may  also  at  some  point  in  the  future 
provide the basis for enablement.  Thus, should Congress 
choose to “save” defective applications,  it  should require 
that the applications be supplemented with the best DNA 
information available.
C. REDEFINING WHAT CAN BE CLAIMED
There is a potential benefit for plant inventors.  Current 
patent rules provide “under no circumstances should the 
claim be directed to . . . fruit or flower in contradistinction 
to  the  plant  bearing  the  flower  or  the  tree  bearing  the 
fruit.”154  This  limitation  made  sense  in  the  context  of 
physical descriptions.155  However, if the plant is defined, 
not by gross physical  properties but by genetic  makeup, 
there is no principled reason why the claim could not be to 
the entire plant or any part thereof, since all parts of the 
same plant would share the same DNA.  Thus, the statute 
could  be  amended  to  permit  multiple  claims  in  a  plant 
patent.
154
1
. Id. § 1610 (second paragraph).
155 . See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
MAX STUL OPPENHEIMER, "THE 'REASONABLE PLANT' TEST: WHEN PROGRESS OUTRUNS THE CONSTITUTION," 9(2) 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 417-452 (2008).
452 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
CONCLUSION
In 1930, Congress felt it had no choice but to provide 
special statutory provisions to protect inventors of plants. 
Those  special  provisions  allowed  simplified,  and 
approximate,  disclosure  but  limited  protection  compared 
with general utility patents.
It is no longer necessary to use approximations.  Better 
disclosures, with potential benefits to the public, are now 
possible.   The  patent  office  and  courts  should  demand 
those  better  disclosures.   In  many  cases,  this  can  be 
accomplished under existing law.  To the extent Congress 
finds the results to be poor public policy, it has the power 
to  amend  the  statute  to  provide  temporary  relief.   In 
addition, Congress can also provide broader protection to 
plant inventors in exchange for the better disclosures which 
technological advances have made possible.
